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SURVIVAL OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

TORTS-SURVIVAL OF THE DOCTRINE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN

MississiPPI-Jones v. Knight, 373 So. 2d 254 (Miss. 1979).

In the summer of 1976 an altercation occurred between picnicker
Ernest Jones and Kevin Knight, a state park ranger, which called into
question the validity of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Jones was
attending a family outing at Enid Reservoir in Yalobusha County. As
he walked near a picnic area he was approached by Knight who directed him to remove his motorcycle from a restricted parking area. A
confrontation ensued. Jones brought suit for intentional assault and
battery against Knight individually and in his official capacity as a
Mississippi Park Commission ranger. The Park Commission, its director and Commission members individually and in their official capacity were also named as defendants by Jones who claimed they employed the ranger knowing him to be unqualified, of a violent nature
and lacking proper training. The defendants demurred and set up the
bar of sovereign immunity. The demurrer was granted and Jones
appealed.'
On appeal, a majority of the Mississippi Supreme Court, per Justice
Broom, upheld the applicability of the immunity doctrine as to the
Park Commission, the director and its members. As to Knight the court
remanded the case to the lower court to determine whether he was
cloaked by the sovereign's immunity or whether he should stand personally liable for his conduct. Justice Bowling joined by Chief Justice
Patterson dissented presenting a detailed analysis of the doctrine and
advocating its abrogation.2
HISTORICAL BASIS FOR THE DOCTRINE

With the exception of Missouri, 3 the general belief among state
courts is that immunity of the state was derived from the decision in
the English case of Russell v. Men of Devon.' In Russell the plaintiff
sought to recover damages from the inhabitants of the County of

'Jones v. Knight, 373 So. 2d 254 (Miss. 1979).
'Id. at 257 (Bowling, J., dissenting).
'The Missouri court believes the doctrine of sovereign immunity preceded Russell because it found language in Russell naming a prior precedent. The court noted that the
common law of England before Russell supported sovereign immunity. The State of
Missouri adopted the common law when it entered the union. Therefore, since Missouri
adopted the common law by legislative act the court could not abrogate it judicially.
O'Dell v. School Dist. of Independence, 521 S.W.2d (Mo. 1975). But see Jones v. State
Highway Comm'n, 557 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. 1977), which held that the common law
adopted in Missouri was "'decisional" thereby granting the court as the judicial branch
power to abrogate the doctrine. Id. at 228.
'100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788).
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Devon for injury to his wagon caused by a bridge being out of repair.
Chief Justice Kenyon denied relief. His opinion concluded:
[W]here an action is brought against a corporation for damages, those
damages are not to be recovered against the incorporators in their individual capacity, but out of their corporate estate; but if the county is to
be considered as a corporation, there is no corporate fund out of which
satisfaction is to be made.'
Critics of this opinion and of the doctrine of sovereign immunity agree
that a different conclusion would have resulted had the county been
incorporated." Incorporated or not, the rule was established that no action would lie by an individual against the inhabitants of a county for
injuries sustained as a consequence of a bridge being out of repair.
Sovereign immunity subsequently found acceptance in the United
States. The case of first impression was Mower v. Inhabitants of
Leicester.7 This 1812 Massachusetts case created no liability for the
town's neglect in repairing yet another bridge. The court held that the
town was a "quasi corporation" and as such, was subject to the common law, however, the town would not be held liable unless the action
was given by statute.' This opinion laid the foundation in the United
States for sovereign immunity, a doctrine a later Mississippi court
would characterize as "that doctrine under which the sovereign, be it
country, state, county or municipality may not be sued without its

consent. "'
Since its establishment in the United States, the doctrine has found
acceptance in many state courts. Several factors have led to this acceptance. A synopsis of the factors includes, the precedence of Russell; the
maxim that the king can do no wrong; the rationale that it is better for
one individual to suffer as opposed to many individuals suffering; the
fact that officers or agents of a sovereign cannot bind a sovereign by
their individual conduct without statutory authority; what is commonly referred to as the trust fund theory; and finally, the effects abrogation of the doctrine would have on the financial stability of the
sovereign. 0
Critics of the immunity doctrine as a valid rule of law make several

'Id. at 362.
'Long v. City of Weirton, 214 S.E.2d 832, 852-53 (W. Va. 1975); Mayor and Burgessess of Lyme Regis v. Henley, 110 Eng. Rep. 29 (1832).
'9 Mass. 247 (1812). It should be noted that here the county was incorporated and
there was a corporate fund out of which judgment could be satisfied, yet the court
adopted the rule of Russell.
Bid. at 250.
'Davis v. Little, 362 So. 2d 642, 643 (Miss. 1978).
10557 S.W.2d at 228-29. Accord, Brown v. City of Craig, 350 Mo. 836, 841, 168
S.W.2d 1080, 1083 (1943); Adams v. University Hosp., 122 Mo. App. 675, 99 S.W. 453
(1907); Mayle v. Penn. Dep't of Highway, 479 Pa. 384, 387-99, 388 A.2d 709, 710-16

(1978).
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arguments. First they say that while following the holding of Russell
employs the rule of precedent, courts should not feel "compelled to
sacrifice their sense of reason and justice upon the altar of the Golden
Calf precedent."" The principle of stare decisis should not render law
static. Courts have recognized the value of stare decisis, but at the
same time equally realized its limitations. It has been stated:
The doctrine of stare decisis serves a very useful and desirable purpose
in our jurisprudence by establishing needed stability and predictability
in the law. However, the doctrine is not intended to provide rigidity in
the law and must not be permitted to do so in cases where an existing
rule or doctrine results in unfair and outmoded discriminatory treatment of persons."2
Critics also contend that the governmental entities which exist today
should not be allowed to lay claim to the inheritance of immunity
granted the kings of England." "[R]ecent events have demonstrated
dramatically that the 'king can do wrong' in America; and when he
does, he must pay the penalty for such wrongdoing."' 4 It should be
noted, ironically, that sovereign immunity for torts is no longer recognized in England."
The rationale that "it is better that an individual should sustain an
injury than that the public should suffer an inconvenience" was presented as a general principle of law in Russell. Proponents of abrogation suggest that inconvenience should not outweigh an individual's
right to be compensated for actual damages sustained." Adherence to

"Lorence v. Hospital Bd. of Morgan County, 320 So. 2d 631, 634 (Ala. 1975). The
court concluded that "[W]here precedent can no longer be supported by reason and
justice, we perceive it our duty to reexamine, and if need be, overrule court made law."
The "Golden Calf precedent" phraseology is from a poem by Sam Walter Foss in 1 B. E.
STEVENSON, THE HOME BOOK OF VERSE 1896 (7th ed. 1940).
"521 S.W.2d at 420-21 (Finch, J., dissenting). In quoting Mr. Justice Holmes, the dissenting opinion stated:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid
down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon
which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists
from blind imitation of the past.
Id. at 421.
"557 S.W.2d at 228; Spencer v. General Hosp. of D.C., 425 F.2d 479, 487 (1969);
Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. Number 302, 18 I11.2d 11, 21, 163 N.E.2d
89, 94 (1959); Hicks v. State, 544 P.2d 1153, 1155 (N.M. 1976). See also Annot., 75
A.L.R. 1196 (1931).
"Jackson v. City of Florence, 320 So. 2d 68, 78 (Ala. 1975). This decision abolished
municipal immunity in the State of Alabama.
"See, e.g., Hillyer v. St. Bartholomew's Hosp. [1909] 2 K.B. 820, 825. "It is now settled
that a public body is liable for the negligence of its servants in the same way as private
individuals would be liable under similar circumstances ... like a public hospital."
Id. at 825.
"Muskoph v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 359 P.2d 457, 459, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 91 (1961);
Molitor v, Kaneland Community Unit Dist. Number 302, 18 Ill. 2d at 22, 163 N.E.2d at
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this antiquated theory is incongruous with our democratic system of
government. 7 It has been held that it is better for an individual to
suffer than for people to suffer vicariously through their government.18
This ruling has been held to be a sham on the constitutional right that
courts should always be open to redress wrongs"9 and cites the fact that
sovereign immunity represents a significant departure from the common law doctrine of respondeat superior.20
Much confusion has arisen from the contention that a sovereign
cannot be held accountable for the conduct of its officers or agents. In
order to clarify exactly which capacity imputes the officers' conduct to
the sovereign, certain classifications have been developed. The terms
governmental or ministerial connote that the negligence of agents will
not be imputed to the sovereign, while the terms proprietary or corporate connote that such conduct will be imputed. When applied, the
terms yield varying results. Garbage collecting has been held to be
governmental2 and hence not imputable, yet sewer disposing is proprietary and imputable." Likewise, it has been held that repairing and
maintaining streets is a function of the sovereign deemed proprietary
or corporate,23 while operating a street sweeper to clean streets is governmental.24 It has been suggested that the only clue as to whether a
particular function is governmental or corporate must be found in
cases addressing that particular function.25 These classifications have
been deemed "not only baffling, but arbitrary, discriminatory and
unreasonable. "26
In an unsophisticated time when demands for governmental services
were few and simple of description, perhaps it was correct to say that
extinguishing fires, caring for the sick, protecting the citizens in their
personal rights and keeping the peace represented the full range of government's mandated responsibilities to its citizens. Perhaps then it was
easy to say that any other activity, for example, constructing works of
improvement, building roads and streets, supplying water to residences
within the municipality and retrieving sewage were completely discretionary with the governmental body. It is obviously not so today."

94; Brown v. Wichita State Univ., 217 Kan. 279, 299, 540, P.2d 66, 83 (1975); Hicks v.
State, 544 P.2d at 1156.
"Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130, 132 (Fla. 1957).

'1id.
"'id.
at 133.
"217 Kan. at 291, 540 P.2d at 77.
"City of Tuscaloosa v. Fitts, 209 Ala. 635, 96 So. 771 (1925).
'Brown v. City of Fairhope, 265 Ala. 596, 93 So. 2d 419 (1957).
"City of Birmingham v. Whitworth, 218 Ala. 603, 119 So. 841 (1929).
"Densmore v. City of Birmingham, 223 Ala. 210, 135 So. 320 (1931).
320 So. 2d at 72.
"217 Kan. at 297, 540 P.2d at 81.
"214 S.E.2d at 857.
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It seems illogical that a governmental body may not be held accountable for the conduct of its employees when a governmental entity can act only through its officers and employees.28 There also appears to be a double standard existing in not holding a government
liable for conduct when, if an individual were involved, the individual
would be held liable for his conduct. The rule of law governing individuals dictates that an absolute duty exists to act in a manner conducive with the avoidance of injury to others, and that if such injury
occurs, the individual will answer for his conduct.29 Nothing less should
be demanded of a sovereign. Governments were not established to
condone the deliberate failure of government bodies to comply with
the law." It has been argued instead that lifting the mantle of immunity would tend to promote care and caution.3 '
A justification offered by those in favor of sustaining the doctrine is
the so-called trust theory which originated as a reason to shield charitable institutions against tort liability. 2 The crux of the theory is that
funds entrusted to charitable institutions should remain in trust for
charitable uses and not be depleted by satisfying judgments."3 The rationale of the theory has been applied as a reason for sustaining governmental immunity, 4 i.e., public funds should be used for public purposes and not be unduly drained to pay private judgments. However,
the fears of draining the public coffer can easily be quelled by legislative enactment of liability insurance laws. 5
ANALYSIS BY THE COURT

In Jones, the majority opinion held that the doctrine of sovereign
immunity was still applicable in Mississippi. In an earlier opinion the
court had noted "growing criticism" of the doctrine, but took no action to end it.3" However, for the first time in Jones two members of
the court called for its demise. Up until this decision there had been
few suggestions that the court itself would take the lead in ending the
immunity. The court had held that legislative action rather than judicial conduct was the appropriate means for eliminating the doctrine
and noted in a recent opinion that the court would not abolish it "at

n521 S.W.2d at 415.
"Dr. Pepper Bottling Co. of Miss. v. Bruner, 245 Miss. 276, 282, 148 So. 2d 199, 201

(1962).
"217 Kan. at 302, 540 P.2d at 85.
"118 I11.
2d at 25, 163 N.E.2d at 95. See also Abernathy v. Sisters of St. Mary's, 446
S.W.2d 599, 603-04.
"18 Ill. 2d at 22, 163 N.E.2d at 94.
"122 Mo. App. at 679-80, 99 S.W. at 456.
App. 567, 575, 109
"Thomas v. Broadlands Community Consol. School Dist., 348 I11.
N.E.2d 636, 640 (1952).
"320 So. 2d at 75, 544 P.2d at 1155.
"Berry v. Hinds County, 344 So. 2d 146 (Miss. 1977).
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this time."37 Following this reasoning the court held in a case decided
the same day as Jones that "[aippellants may find that their claim here
pressed lends itself to an effort to obtain a special appropriation by
legislative act.""8 The dissenters in Jones, however, recognized the
power, need and duty of the judiciary to act on abolishing the doctrine
in Mississippi. 9
The dissenting opinion noted actions taken by sister states in dealing
with the doctrine. The Alabama Supreme Court after wading through
an historical analysis of the doctrine came to the conclusion that its ill
effects could no longer be supported." Realizing that it had previously
upheld the doctrine, the Alabama court declared that the abolition
would only apply prospectively thereby padding the effects of its decision. 1
The Florida Supreme Court was cognizant of the probable confusion and difficulties which would result from partial abrogation of the
doctrine. Therefore, the court decided upon uprooting the rule bodily
and laying it aside as any other "archaic and outmoded concept"
'
rather than just making a "pruning and paring effort."42
Mississippi
lawmakers have apparently chosen the latter course. The Mississippi
Supreme Court has characterized legislative action as "chipping away
at [the] doctrine of governmental immunity in appropriate areas."" An
example of this conduct is the fact that suits may be maintained
against the sovereign pursuant to express and/or implied authority by
statutes."
Louisiana weighed policy considerations, then decided to discard
the doctrine. "[W]hen an unfair doctrine does not function for the
public good, but only for the administrative convenience of a State
agency, the court should do whatever it can to infuse justice in the
relationship between the state agency and the private person."4 Both
"id. at 151.
"Jagnandan v. Miss. State Univ., 373 So. 2d 252, 254 (Miss. 1979).
"373 So. 2d 257 (Bowling, J., dissenting).
With deference to the majority, its opinion impliedly admits that the nonprotection of our people is wrong, but shifts the burden to the legislature. I certainly
agree that the legislature should act; however, I can understand why it would be
reluctant to do so. That does not relieve this [c]ourt of its duty. I believe it is the
[court's duty to protect our citizens from wrongs and should act so to do.
Id. at 267.
*320So. 2d 68.

'lid. at 75.
1296 So. 2d at 132.
0344 So. 2d at 148.
"Ayres v. Board of Trustees of Leake County Agricultural High School, 134 Miss. 363,
372, 98 So. 847, 848 (1924). But cf. Smith v. Doehler Metal Furniture Co., 195 Miss.
538, 545, 15 So. 2d 421, 421 (1943); State v. Woodruff, 170 Miss. 744, 766, 150 So. 760,
762 (1934).
'Board of Comm'r of Port of New Orleans v. Splendour Shipping and Enterprises
Co., 273 So. 2d 19, 25 (La. 1973).
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the majority and dissenting opinions in Jones recognized the duty to
protect citizens of the state as well as allowing them forums for redressing wrongs done them.
IF MISSISSIPPI ABROGATES SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

If abrogation is the result of this first rippling of waters the supreme
court will not be without guidance in implementing an abrogation decision. The court could follow decisions from states that have previously scuttled the doctrine. When determining the time span for carrying
out abolition, courts have generally chosen three paths.
Some have abolished the doctrine retrospectively, permitting utilization
of the change as to all claims not barred by limitation .... Others have
abolished the rule prospectively, effective on either the date of filing or
publication of the opinion .... A third approach has been to discard the
rule prospectively on a specified date in the future, giving governmental
units 46time to adjust their financial planning and perhaps obtain insurance.
A means for satisfying judgments would have to be established if
the immunity is ended. The Mississippi legislature has provided that
funds be set aside to satisfy certain judgments. 47 Likewise, authorization has been given for the procurement of insurance coverage for
county owned motor vehicles.48 The accident contingent fund legislation allows an injured person a right of action against counties arising
from accidents involving county buses.'9 To fund these judgments an
accident contingent fund was set up in the state treasury.5" Monetary
limits were placed on all claims arising under this enactment.5' Enactments allowing hospitals to purchase liability insurance have also
gained passage.5" With these examples in mind, it appears that the legislature recognizes the duty to provide means for sustaining a remedy
for the wrong done an individual. Perhaps the .partial actions of the
legislature have led the Mississippi judiciary to believe that total abrogation of sovereign immunity rests within the powers of the legislature. The supreme court has concluded that the legislature is in a bet-

"521 S.W.2d at 421. This language was later adopted in Jones, 557 S.W.2d at 231,
wherein the court abolished sovereign immunity prospectively except for the cases decided that day. See also Parish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239, 429 S.W.2d 45 (1968); Muskoph
v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961); Evans v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 174 Colo. 97, 482 P.2d 968 (1971).
7
" MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-41-39 (Supp. 1979), §§ 19-13-49, 19-13-51 (1972).
"MISS. CODE ANN. § 19-7-8 (Supp. 1979).
"MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-41-37 (Supp. 1979).
"MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-41-39 (Supp. 1979).
"MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-41-41 (Supp. 1979).
"MIss. CODE ANN. § 41-13-37 (1972). See generally Rolph v. Board of Trustees of
Forrest County Gen. Hosp., 346 So. 2d 377, 378 (Miss. 1977).
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ter position to limit and restrict claims and to provide the ways and
means for paying such claims.5 3 The dissenting -opinion in Jones, however, concluded that since the doctrine was judicially created it may
be judicially abrogated, 4 thus following the reasoning that, "The judicial branch of the government need not call upon the legislative
branch to rectify an error which the judicial branch itself created.' 55
Even more applicable to the existing condition in Mississippi is the
argument that "[ijf there is the power to abrogate in part, there is a
right to abrogate completely.""8
CONCLUSION

A recent Mississippi Supreme Court decision 57 reveals the infirmity
of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The court concluded that
"[t]here is no defense offered in this case except the State's sovereign
immunity from suit. Otherwise, .

.

. [the appellee] would, under princi-

ples of natural justice be entitled to recover." 8
Partial abrogation has been effectuated by prior legislative enactments in Mississippi. The dissenting opinion in Jones exemplifies a
growing concern of whether partial legislative abrogation is substantial
enough to protect the rights of individuals. The fact that there is a call
for an end to governmental immunity, even though the voice is a minority, suggests that the court realizes the innate problems surrounding
the doctrine which have not been solved by partial abrogation.
M. Elizabeth Bourland

"344 So. 2d at 151.
s'373 So. 2d at 265 (Bowling, J., dissenting).
"Adkins v. St. Francis Hosp. of Charleston, 149 W. Va. 705, 720, 143 S.E.2d 154, 163
(1965).
N521 S.W.2d at 419.
'"342 So. 2d 290.

aId. at 294.

